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1. Introduction
Does environmental regulation have a significant negative impact on industry location?
This question is at the heart of the trade and environment debate. A positive answer to
this question might give grounds to worry regarding a host of interrelated issues: the
emergence of ‘pollution havens’ in environmentally lax countries, harm to
competitiveness in environmentally strict countries, and a consequent attempt by
jurisdictions to undercut each other’s environmental standards. Such issues have served
as an additional impediment to the conclusion of the latest round of WTO trade
liberalization that started in Seattle in 1999 [36,10]. Industrialists in the EU are also
worried about the extent to which the EU Emissions Trading Scheme impairs their
competitiveness [33]. Similarly in the US, competitiveness concerns were raised during
the debate on the impact of North American Free Trade. Critics argued that differential
environmental standards across Canada, Mexico and US would result in massive capital
flight to Mexico which would cause more overall pollution.
The foregoing topics have received considerable attention in the academic literature
and much of the studies are collected under the denominator of the so-called Pollution
Haven Hypothesis (PHH).1 This hypothesis purports that changes in environmental
regulation results in a relocation of dirty goods production from countries with stringent
environmental regulation to those with lax environmental regulation. While the
hypothesis is intuitively plausible, reviews of the empirical literature have concluded that
the evidence is mixed or that the correlation between environmental regulation and
industry performance is weak (see, for e.g., [9,14]. Taylor [34] has further pointed out
that empirical work on the PHH has been troubled by, among other things, the fact that
researchers at times mistake a pollution haven effect for the pollution haven hypothesis.
Pollution haven effects occur if differences in the levels of environmental regulatory
stringency affect the inter-jurisdictional distribution of polluting industries. Such effects,
if present, are only one determinant of industry location. The PHH however postulates
that the interaction between environmental regulation and pollution intensity is the most
important determinant for firm location, or at least more important than other
determinants, such as the availability of capital and skilled labor. This leads – it is
hypothesised – to a “race to the bottom”, where jurisdictions have incentives to lower
environmental standards to maintain or increase their share of those industries most
affected by such standards.
The differential stringency of environmental regulation is only one of several
motives for location choices and hence calls in the recent literature for empirical work
weighing the relative strength of these different motives2 [34]. Our aim is to present a
way of undertaking such an assessment. The analysis in this paper complements those of
1

See, for example, a recent edited volume dedicated to the Pollution Haven Hypothesis [11]
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Such calls also remind us of a seemingly trivial but a more general point about hypothesis testing. Strictly
speaking, the question of how accurate a hypothesis is necessitates an explicit statement of an alternative
hypothesis with which the maintained hypothesis is to be compared. In the absence of an alternative
hypothesis, normal statistical methods of inference are not applicable and rejection/acceptance of the
maintained hypotheses is a matter of mere judgment [19, pp. 45-47].
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Becker and Henderson [4], Greenstone[12], and List and McHone [22] who have
documented evidence of the pollution haven effect using county level plant data
respectively for the US and New York State. Becker and Henderson study four pollution
intensive industries, Greenstone uses dummies for dirty as opposed to clean industries,
and List and McHone compare the location decisions of polluting new plants in
attainment (stringent) and non-attainment (lax) counties.3 We propose an alternative
approach by explicitly including a continuous variable of pollution intensity per
industries so that we can address the question: ‘how polluting must an industry be to
respond to environmental regulation?’, a refinement of the typical question in the
literature: ‘are polluting industries affected by environmental regulation?’. Also, we
include other determinants of firm location so that we can compare the different
determinants and distinguish between the pollution haven hypothesis and the pollution
haven effect. In this sense, this paper also complements Levinson and Taylor’s study [20]
which, like this paper, uses a continuous measure of pollution intensity as an explanatory
variable but it does not compare environmental policy with other location determinants.4
Our paper contributes to the literature in three ways. First, we integrate two strands
of literature; one from economic geography and one from environmental economics. We
employ a general empirical trade model that has recently appeared in the new economic
geography literature but has not previously been used in the pollution haven literature.
The model analyzes the joint role of country and industry characteristics in determining
industry location. Specifically, it estimates how high and low levels of country
characteristics interact with high and low intensities of the corresponding industry
attributes in location decisions. The model allows us to supplement and expand recent
findings in the empirical PHH literature that the impact of environmental regulation tends
to be “heterogeneous both spatially and across industry” [27, p. 261; 28]. The model
complements the analyses by Cole and Elliot [6] and Chintrakarn and Millimet [5] as it
uses explicit variables for environmental policy and pollution intensity as a driver of
location, rather than studying the pollution haven effect indirectly by regressing emission
levels against trade intensity, income, the capital/labor ratio, and their various interaction
effects.
Second, we elaborate on the interpretation of the conditional effects associated with
the interactive terms in our empirical model. The most common method for probing
interactive effects is to test significance of coefficients at specific levels of the predictors.
In our case, the standard approach would be to test significance for location dependence
on environmental policy stringency, given a specific level of the industry’s pollution
intensity. We, more broadly, present the dependence relation over the whole range of
3

Our paper also complements papers in a related strand of the literature such as List and Co [21], Keller
and Levinson [16] and Xing and Kolstad [38] who focus respectively on US inbound and outbound FDI.
Each of these papers compares regression results for dirty and clean industries (or all manufacturing) and
obtains some evidence of the pollution haven effect.
4
Levinson and Taylor [20] also incorporate endogeneity in their study arguing that allowing for
endogeneity helps reveal evidence of the pollution haven effect. However List et al. [23], who find larger
pollution haven effects than previously reported, argue that these greater effects are not due to the treatment
of environmental regulation as exogenous or endogenous. Admittedly, endogeneity is a potential problem
that may bias our results but we put aside, for now, the endogeneity issue and empirically assesses the
relative role of the interaction between industries’ pollution intensity and the stringency of environmental
policy against other determinants of industry location.
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industry’s pollution intensity and employ the Johnson-Neyman technique to calculate
regions of significance and confidence bands for evaluating the conditional effects.
Third, as we apply our approach to data on manufacturing industries from European
countries, the analysis gives us a picture of country heterogeneity within Europe and its
consequences for firm location. The dataset covers countries with stringent environmental
regulation like Finland and Sweden as well as countries with relatively lax environmental
regulation such as Greece and Belgium. With respect to industries, the dataset includes
pollution intensive industries such as Industrial Chemicals and clean industries such as
Radio, TV & Communication. The results indicate that the pollution haven effect can be
uncovered, and that the relative strength of such an effect is of about the same magnitude
as other determinants of industry location. Further investigation of the conditional effects
indicates that a significant negative effect on industry location is observed only at
relatively high levels of pollution intensity. Thus, the focus on environmental stringency
in this literature is only half the story: both stringency of environmental regulation and
industry pollution intensity matter. The findings we report suggest that for the PHH
literature the interaction between the differential stringency of environmental regulation
and differences in industry pollution intensity is an essential element
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the econometric
model. Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 discusses the empirical results and Section
5 concludes.
2. Theory and empirical model
The model aims to investigate the relevance of various factors in industry’s
location. In particular, we want to know why some countries attract a high share of
certain industries, while other countries have a much lower share. Formally, we search
for the determinants of the share of country i in the total manufacturing production of
industry k, that is s i , k defined as s ik = z i ,k ∑i ' z i ',k , where z i , k measures the size of
industry k at country i, and the country label with prime (i') is used to sum over all
countries.
Trade theorists’ discussions of industry location are informed by two strands of
literature. Comparative advantage arguments based on the role of factor endowments can
be derived from Heckscher-Ohlin (HO) models. Recent theoretic work has extended the
standard HO models to accommodate environmental factors where cross-country
differences in the stringency of environmental regulation play a role in trade patterns, e.g.
[1,7,8,9]. New economic geography (NEG), by contrast, stresses the importance of
increasing returns, market access and upstream and downstream linkages. NEG predicts
that while activity will be dispersed when transport costs are either ‘very high’ or ‘very
low’, clustering of industries occur when transport costs are ‘intermediate’.5 The HO and
NEG theories should be regarded as complementary and their relative importance for
industrial location outcomes is thus an empirical issue.
Recently, Midelfart-Knarvik et al. [26] developed an empirical model for the
location of European industry that incorporates both types of effects, i.e. comparative
advantage and market access. They estimate a model that takes account of the HO
5

See, e.g., Krugman and Venables [18].
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arguments by relating the factor intensities of industries to the factor endowments of
countries. The NEG story is captured by examining how the share of intermediates in
costs, the share of sales to industrial users, and scale economies interact with market
potential in determining location.
We extend Midelfart-Knarvik et al.’s [26] econometric model and include
environmental factors. Countries are heterogeneous in various characteristics such as
endowments of natural resources and skilled labor, and proximity to markets. We add to
these country characteristics the relative stringency of environmental regulation.
Similarly, industries differ in their various attributes such as the intensity of use of
production factors like skilled labor, and their reliance on intermediate inputs. We add to
these attributes the pollution intensity of the industry. In equilibrium we expect that
industries that highly value a regional characteristic locate there. All else equal, a
technology intensive industry will locate in a region with abundant skilled labor, while
pollution intensive industries will be attracted to countries with a relatively lax
environmental regulation. In the context of the PHH literature, the relevant empirical
question is how strong the interaction is between environmental regulation and pollution
intensity, relative to the interaction between other country and industry characteristics.
Central in the model are the potential interaction channels, indexed j. For each
interaction channel, we have a vector of associated country characteristics x j , and a
vector of associated industry attributes y j . For the skilled-labor interaction channel, x j
measures countries’ skilled labor abundance, while y j measures the industries’ skilled
labor intensity. For the pollution interaction channel, x j measures the countries’
stringency of environmental regulation (or its inverse, the laxity), while y j measures the
industries’ pollution intensity. For each interaction channel, there is a neutral country
characteristic level χ j , also referred to as a cut off point, such that a country with this
characteristic does not specifically attract industries with high or low levels for the
associated industry attribute. Similarly, there is a neutral industry attribute level γ j , or cut
off point, such that an industry with this attribute level does not consider the associated
country-characteristic in the selection of its location. Using these parameters, MidelfartKnarvik et al.’s model can be written as a reduced form equation:
ln( si ,k ) = c + α ln( popi ) + ∑ j β j ( xij − χ j )( ykj − γ j ) + ε i ,k ,

(1)

where popi is the population living in country i, α is a scale coefficient, and β j measures
the strength of interaction effect j. The country characteristics and industry attributes are
chosen such that the interaction coefficients β j are expected to be positive. Expanding the
equation we obtain the estimating equation as follows:
ln( si ,k ) = c '+ α ln( popi ) + ∑ j ( β j xij ykj − γ ' j xij − χ ' j ykj ) + ε i ,k ,

(2)

where γ ' j = β j γ j , χ ' j = β j χ j , and c ' = c + ∑ j β j χ j γ j . After we have estimated β, χ ', and γ '
from (2) we can inverse the procedure and calculate the parameters χ and γ in (1).6
6

When different interaction effects make use of the same country characteristic or industry attribute, the
calculation of the cut-off points χ and γ becomes slightly more complicated. See notes to Table 3.
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We specify seven interaction channels. The first three interaction channels are
associated with the traditional HO trade model.7 The fourth interaction channel is the
environmental variable which is the main concern in this paper. The last three interaction
channels represent the NEG concerns of the model, namely the pull of centrality
interacting with scale economies, and forward and backward linkages. In full, the
interaction channels are: (i) Agricultural production as percentage of GDP times industry
agricultural input intensity;8 (ii) Secondary & higher education as percentage population
times industry skilled labor intensity; (iii) Researchers & Scientists as percentage of labor
force times industry R&D intensity; (iv) Environmental standard laxity times industry
pollution intensity; (v) Market potential times industry intermediate input use; (vi)
Market potential times industry sale to industry; and finally (vii) Market potential times
industry average plant size. The main hypothesis regarding the new economic geography
interaction variables is that a firm’s location decision involves consideration of market
access alongside production costs.9 In Table 1 we present the country characteristics and
their association with the interaction channels, and the data sources. In Table 2, we
present the industry attributes and their association with the interaction channels.
3. Interactions and regions of significance
From the location model as in equation (1), we can directly calculate the change in
an industry’s share a country attracts as dependent on a change in a country
characteristic:
∂ ln( si ,k )
∂xij

= β j ( ykj − γ j ) = β j ykj − γ ' j .

(3)

Given a positive interaction coefficient β j, it is immediately clear from equation (3)
that the increase of characteristic j in a country increases the share of industry k if that
industry’s level of attribute j exceeds the attribute’s cut-off level, that is, if ykj > γ j . An
increase of a country’s characteristic j will repel other industries. For example, countries
with lax environmental policies may attract pollution-intensive industries and repel clean
industries, or stated the other way around, countries with strict environmental policies
may attract clean industries and repel pollution-intensive industries. What is considered a
clean or a dirty industry is determined by the cut-off value γ j. An immediately obvious
comparison of interest therefore is that between the industry’s cut-off points γ j and the
mean, maximum, and minimum values of these industry attributes reported in Table 2.
We do not further discuss the country characteristics cut-off levels χ j.
7

Capital is ignored because of the assumption of capital mobility across Europe.

8

Following Midelfart-Knarvik et al. [26], the rationale for taking the variable Agricultural production as %
GDP instead of the underlying conventional factor inputs such as land is that, since our concern is the
pattern of manufacturing, agriculture can be considered as an exogenous measure of the ‘endowment of
agriculture’.
9
See, e.g., Venables [35].
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The expression in (3) also reveals that the marginal effect of a change in a country
characteristic j on the share of an industry located within it is proportional to the
j
interaction coefficient β j, and the difference between the industry’s attribute level yk and
the cut-off point γ j. Estimation of β j and γ j therefore permits these marginal effects to be
estimated. Substitution of the estimated coefficients β^ j and γ^ 'j gives, for any given
industry attribute level ykj , the variance of the estimated marginal effect in (3):
var[ βˆ j ( ykj − γˆ j )] = ( ykj )2 var[ βˆ j ] + var[γˆ ' j ] − 2 ykj cov[ βˆ j , γˆ ' j ] .

(4)

Thus, estimation of β^ j and γ^ 'j allows us to plot the marginal effect and associated
confidence interval of environmental policy on industry location, as dependent on the
industry’s pollution intensity. This approach of calculating regions of significance and
confidence bands for evaluating conditional effects is known as the Johnson-Neyman (JN) technique [13]. Clearly the J-N technique has advantages over the more common
approach which would involve testing the conditional effects at designated levels of
environmental stringency (e.g., high, medium, or low) [2].
Although the focus here is environmental (pollution intensity and the stringency of
environmental regulation) the procedure and insights are general. For example, one could
estimate the marginal effect of changes in a nation’s level of skilled labour on its share of
skill -intensive industries.
4. Data
We base our analysis on a one-period cross-country cross-industry sample. The
choice of the period (average of 1990-1994) was dictated by availability of most of the
explanatory variables.10 Descriptions of the variables and data sources are presented in
Tables 1 and 2. The discussion here is limited to some relevant issues not contained in the
table and a further description of the main variables of interest in this paper, i.e. the
environmental variables. Data on each of the country characteristics pertain to around the
year 1990 and are obtained from Midelfart-Knarvik et al. [26]. Input-output data (i.e.
agricultural intensity, intermediate input intensity and industry sale) are constructed as
(output) weighted averages of the data for Denmark, Germany, France and the UK for
1990. The environmental standard laxity variable is constructed as one minus the
Environmental Sustainability Index (scaled to [0,1]) which is constructed jointly by
World Economic Forum, Yale Center for Environmental Law and Policy, and Center for
International Earth Science Information Network, Columbia University. This index refers
to the year 2001 and is based on a total of 67 underlying variables (such as environmental
regulatory stringency, environmental regulatory innovation and number of EIA
guidelines).11,12
10

We have also experimented with each of the five individual year values for the left hand side variable.
The results are fairly similar.
11
This index is also used in Javorcik and Wei [15].
12

We have also experimented with an alternative measure of environmental regulation stringency from the
Global Competitiveness Report 2001-2002, published by the World Economic Forum. The results are not
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We use two alternative measures of pollution intensity. The first measure is taken
from Low and Yeats [24] who provide estimates of pollution abatement and control costs
as a share of the value of industry output in the USA for the year 1988. The second
measure is based on the Toxic Release Inventory (TRI) data compiled by the US
Environmental Protection Agency. The TRI data catalogues releases of various types of
emissions into air, water, land and underground for each manufacturing industry group in
the US. Such emissions measured by weight for the year 1990-1995 are averaged and
normalized by the value of industry shipments for the year 1992.13 The full data on all the
explanatory variables are reported in the appendix in Tables A.1 and A.2.
< Tables 1 and 2 about here >
5. Results and discussion
Table 3 reports the results of the Ordinary Least Squares estimation of equation (1)
for four different specifications. Models I and II use the full model with the NEG and HO
interaction channels, with two different specifications for the industry pollution intensity
attribute. Models III and IV use only the first four HO variables, again with alternative
measures of the industry pollution intensity attribute. Models I and III use abatement
costs, and Models II and IV use industry emissions, as the measure of pollution intensity.
For all models, the estimated coefficients for the interaction channels β reported in
Table 3 are expected to have positive signs. The estimations confirm the expectations for
the HO channels. Thus, industries with large inputs from agriculture tend to locate in
countries with a large agricultural industries, industries with above-average valued labor
input tend to locate in countries with an above-average skilled population, R&D intensive
industries tend to locate in R&D rich countries, and indeed, industries that are relatively
more pollution intensive (such as Industrial Chemicals and Drugs & Medicines) are
attracted to countries which have relatively lax environmental standards. We note that
although the β coefficient for skilled labour is not significant in Table 3, we show later
that the level of skilled labour supply has a significant positive effect on the share of the
most skilled-labor intensive industry (see Table 5).
The additional three NEG variables, however do not all have the expected sign and
are insignificant. A formal test of comparing the full model with the model of only the
HO variables (including the environmental variable) amounts to a test of whether the
estimates of the coefficients of the NEG variables are jointly zero. If so, the parsimonious
model is preferred. The F statistic (F [7, 187]) for the hypothesis of an HO model is 1.62
for Model I and 1.81 for Model II which, given a critical value at the 5% significance
level of 2.01, indicates that the null hypothesis that the HO model is appropriate cannot
be rejected. We therefore omit the NEG variables and confine further analysis to Models
III and IV. By comparing models I with III and II with IV, we see that the strength of the
pollution interaction effect is robust with respect to the inclusion or exclusion of the NEG
reported but confirm our finding of significant positive coefficients for the interaction channel (with the
two alternative pollution intensity variables discussed below) but gave a wider uncertainty interval for the
marginal effects per industry as in equation (4).
13
Our second measure of pollution intensity is also used in Javorcik and Wei [15]. These authors also
employ an alternative measure of pollution intensity similar to our first measure, i.e. based on pollution
abatement expenditure.
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channels. For all other interaction effects, we also find robust results. This insignificance
of the NEG variables contrasts with the finding of Midelfart-Knarvik et al. [26] who
report significant estimates for the market potential variable but their findings do not
seem to be particularly robust as can be seen from Midelfart-Knarvik et al. [25].
Using equation (3), a comparison of the industry’s cut-off points with the mean
value informs us on the effect of the country characteristic on the average industry within
our sample. The first remarkable finding is that the cut-off point for agricultural intensity
is above the maximum attribute level observed in the sample. Thus, as equation (3)
predicts, for all industries within the sample, the industry share in a country decreases as
agriculture’s contribution to that country’s GDP increases. For the food processing
industry (the most intensive industry), the decrease is relatively modest, whereas for the
non-ferrous metal industry (the least agriculture-intensive industry), the effect is very
large. An explanation for this finding is that, in general, manufacturing and agriculture
are strongly negatively correlated. For all other factor inputs, the cut-off point is between
the minimum and maximum industry attribute level, signifying that more intensive
industries are attracted by the more resource abundant countries, while less intensive
industries typically locate in countries that are less resource abundant for that specific
resource. For skilled labor, the cut-off point (1.04) is below the industry’s attribute’s
mean (1.08), which means that within our sample, on average, industries are attracted by
countries with higher levels of skilled labor. Regarding R&D intensity, the cut-off point
(0.04) is also below the mean (0.087) so that, on average, firms are attracted by R&D-rich
countries. For both measures of pollution intensity, the cut-off points (0.86 and 2.04) are
above the sample means (0.73 and 1.67) meaning that, on average, firms are not attracted
by lax environmental policies, or stated inversely, are not deterred by stricter
environmental policy. This result is a first indication that strict environmental policy does
not deter manufacturing industries in general. That is, even though the most pollutionintensive industries show a significant smaller share in countries with strict
environmental policies, on average, within our sample, industries do not prefer to locate
in countries with lax environmental policies.
< Table 3 about here >
The coefficients reported in Table 3 do not allow one to assess the relative
importance of the various interaction channels. To allow such an assessment of the
relative importance of the various interaction effects, the estimated cut-off points from
equation (2), as presented in Table 3, are substituted in (1) and the dependent variable and
independent variables are normalized. Expressed in this manner, the estimated
coefficients are standardized and hence are comparable. In other words, we are measuring
here the effects on the dependant variable in terms of standard deviation units. The
resulting standardized coefficients (which Wooldridge [37, p. 196] refers to as “betacoefficients”) are independent of the scaling of the regressors and are reported in Table 4.
That is, the choice for the unit of measurement for the country characteristics and
industry attributes does not affect the coefficients reported in Table 4, and thereby the
explanatory variables are put on equal footing.
Considering the standardized coefficients reported in Table 4, we note that the
agriculture interaction remains the single largest determinant for industry location. The

9
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interaction between environmental policy and pollution intensity is of next greatest
magnitude but is, in size, not much larger than the skilled labour and R&D interaction
effects. The relative importance of the four interaction channels is robust across the four
model specifications (although only standardized coefficients from Models III and IV are
reported here).
< Table 4 about here >
The coefficients reported in Table 4 provide a general measure of the relative
importance of the various interaction effects but we are also interested in the more
specific strength of the interaction effects for the most intensive industries, that is, we
may ask how strongly an abundance of skilled labor attracts the most skill-intensive
industries, compared to how strongly a lax environmental policy attracts the most
pollution intensive industries. For this, we use equation (3). We recall that the marginal
effect on the industry share of a change in the country characteristic j is proportional to
the interaction coefficient βj as presented in Tables 3 and 4, and to the distance between
j
the industry’s attribute level yk and the cut-off point γ j. Thus, for industries above the cutoff point, an increase in the country characteristic will increase the industry share, while
for industries below the cut-off point, an increase in the country characteristic will
decrease the share. Table 5 presents the marginal effects of country characteristics on
location for the most resource-intensive industries, that is, equation (3) evaluated at the
maximum industry attribute level. We only report the HO interaction models (III and IV).
For these models, we find that all four country characteristics are significant determinants
for location of the most intensive industries, including skilled labour abundance.
Agricultural abundance does not have the expected positive effect on the location
of the food processing industry. The sign is negative because the cut-off point is above
the maximum attribute level observed in the sample, as discussed above. The magnitude
of the three other country characteristic marginal effects appear similar in Columns (III)
and (IV), but for a proper comparison, in Columns (III′) and (IV′), we report the marginal
effects using the standardized independent and dependent variables. Thus, it can be seen
that in Models III and IV, a one standard deviation increase in the skilled labor supply
increases the share of the most skilled-labor intensive industry (drugs and medicines) by
about 0.1 times the standard deviation. The scale of the environmental policy effect for
the dirtiest industry (industrial chemicals) is similar to this skilled labour effect, but the
responsiveness of R&D intensive industries to a one standard deviation change of R&D
abundance is far greater.
< Table 5 about here >
Figure 1 portrays in more detail the importance of a country’s environmental policy
on its share of particular industries.14 It is based on equations (3) and (4) and uses results
from Model III. It shows the marginal effect of environmental policy on the production
share conditioned on the pollution intensity of the industry, with a 90% confidence
interval added. The upward slope of the solid line represents the marginal effect of
14

This Figure was constructed using the web-based tool of Preacher, Curran and Bauer [32]
(http://www.people.ku.edu/~preacher/interact/mlr2.htm), see also Brambor et al. [3].
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environmental standard laxity for different levels of pollution intensity, as depicted by
equation (3). The figure shows the cut-off point 0.86, where the solid line crosses the xaxis. For this level of pollution intensity, environmental laxity has no effect on location.
For the industries to the left of this point a more stringent environmental policy increases
the industry share.15 To the right of this point a more environmentally lax policy may
attract a higher industry share. The 90% confidence intervals around the line permit us to
evaluate at which values of pollution intensity environmental standard laxity has a
statistically significant impact on production shares.
A lax environmental policy has a statistically significant positive effect on industry
share when the pollution intensity level is above 1.86, above which there is only one
pollution intensive industry in our sample. On the right side of the figure, we find the
pollution intensive industries such as Industrial Chemicals, (with the highest intensity,
labelled ‘H’). On the left side of the figure, we find the majority of the industries that are
less pollution intensive (the average and median value of pollution intensity are shown as
‘A’ and ‘M’ respectively). The ‘cleanest’ industry with the lowest pollution intensity
level (Radio, TV and Communication Equipment) is shown by the point labelled ‘L’.
The graph indicates that while the pollution haven effect is present its negative
effect on industry location is significant only at relatively high levels of pollution
intensity. At moderate levels of pollution intensity, the influence of environmental
standard would be small compared to other forces, and at low levels of pollution
intensity, strict environmental standards are not a deterrent at all.
< Figure 1 about here >
Finally, in Table 6 we compare our estimated industry shares with observed shares
and we calculate counterfactual industry shares: predicted shares if country
characteristics (e.g. environmental policy) changed. We do this first by comparing
estimated and actual industry shares for the most intensive industries in terms of each of
agriculture, skills, R&D and pollution intensity. In each case we compare these actual and
predicted shares for the most and least abundant countries in the respective input. We
then simulate these shares if, in each case, the most abundant country would become least
abundant, and vice versa.
The comparison of the predicted and actual shares gives an idea of the fit of the
model. A comparison of the counterfactual with the predicted shares answers the question
how important the specific country characteristic is in determining the industry share. If
the most abundant country in a particular factor were to have the level of endowment of
the least abundant country what would be its share of production? The reverse also holds
for the case of the least abundant country. With respect to the environmental factor input,
we find that the model predicts a share of 7.3% of the most pollution intensive industry’s
production (Industrial chemicals) in the country with the most lax environmental standard
(Belgium), compared with an actual share of 4.8%. The model predicts a share of only

15

Though in this specific case, there are no industries where strict environmental policy has a significantly
positive effect on their share, the model does not rule out this possibility. A possible explanation for such a
positive relationship is that countries with strict environmental policies also have high levels of attractive
characteristics such as good governance or low corruption levels, see [29,30].
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0.8% in the most environmentally stringent country (Finland) while the actual figure is
1.0%.
If Belgium were to adopt the most stringent environmental regulation from Finland,
the model predicts a decline of the share by more than half, that is, 4.2% point. If Finland
were to copy the lax standards of Belgium, it would see its share increase by more than a
factor 2, that is, 1.2% point. A change in R&D country characteristics has a similar effect
in the sense that if Sweden would decrease its number of researchers per thousand to the
level of Greece, its share of the Communication equipment industry is predicted to halve,
while if Greece could copy Sweden’s research abundance, it would see its share double.
As both countries are fairly small, in absolute terms the change in industry shares would
be less compared to the environmental policy change. A change in the abundance of
skilled labor has somewhat less substantial consequences.
< Table 6 about here >
6. Concluding remarks
This paper is an empirical analysis of the extent to which environmental regulation
influences industry location in Europe vis-à-vis other location determinants, mainly the
traditional HO factor endowment forces.
The analysis is based on a general empirical trade model. It has a distinctive feature
in that it models the theoretically-emphasized joint role of country and industry
characteristics in determining industry location. The model is applied to data on 16
manufacturing industries from 13 European countries. The Johnson-Neyman technique
was used to address the interactive terms in the empirical model and to calculate regions
of significance and confidence bands for evaluating the conditional effects.
This dataset covers countries with stringent environmental regulation like Finland
and Sweden, and countries with relatively lax environmental regulation such as Greece
and Belgium. With respect to industries, the dataset includes the most pollution intensive
industries such as Industrial Chemicals as well as relatively clean industries such as
Radio, TV & Communication Equipment
The results indicate that the pollution haven effect can be uncovered, and the
relative magnitude of this effect is about the same as that of other determinants of
industry location. This might be interpreted as finding the pollution haven effect but
failing to support the pollution haven hypothesis.
Specifically, we find in our sample that whereas an increase in the skilled labour
supply increases the share of an industry with mean levels of characteristics, in contrast,
increased environmental regulatory laxity does not result in an increased share of the
‘average’ industry. However when the most polluting, rather than the average, industry is
considered, increased environmental regulatory laxity does result in a higher proportion
of this dirty industry locating there. The approach presented could be developed in a
number of ways in future research, for example the issue of endogeneity of
environmental policy in this framework, and the use of panel data for more robust
estimation.

12

Published by Berkeley Electronic Press Services, 2009

11

Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Working Papers, Art. 261 [2009]

References
[1]
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17]
[18]
[19]
[20]
[21]

W. Antweiler, B. Copeland, S. Taylor, Is free trade good for the environment?, Am.
Econ. Rev. 91 (2001) 877–907.
D.J. Bauer, P.J. Curran, Probing interactions in fixed and multilevel regression:
inferential and graphical techniques, Multivar. Behav. Res. 40 (2005) 373–400.
T. Bambor, L. Clark, M. Golder, Understanding interaction models: improving
empirical analyses, Polit. Anal. 14 (2006) 63–82.
R.A. Becker, J.V. Henderson, Effects of air quality regulations on polluting
industries, J. Polit. Econ. 108 (2001) 379–421.
P. Chintrakarn, D.L. Millimet, The environmental consequences of trade: evidence
from subnational trade flows, J. Environ. Econ. Manage. 52 (2006) 430–453.
M.A. Cole, R.J.R. Elliott, Determining the trade-environment composition effect:
the role of capital, labor and environmental regulations, J. Environ. Econ. Manage.
46 (2003) 363–383.
B. Copeland, S. Taylor, North-South trade and the environment, Q. J. Econ. 109
(1994) 755–787.
B. Copeland, S. Taylor, Trade and transboundary pollution, Am. Econ. Rev. 85
(1995) 716–737.
B. Copeland, S. Taylor, International Trade and the Environment: Theory and
Evidence, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2003.
J. Ederington, A. Levinson, J. Minier, Trade liberlization and pollution havens,
Adv. Econ. Anal. Pol. 4 (2004) Article 6.
D. Fullerton, The Economics of Pollution Havens, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham,
2006.
M. Greenstone, The impacts of environmental regulations on industrial activity:
evidence from the 1970 and 1977 Clean Air Acts and the Census of Manufactures,
J. Polit. Econ. 110 (2002) 1175–1219.
B.E. Huitema, The Analysis of Covariance and Alternatives, Wiley, New York,
1980.
A.B. Jaffe, S.R. Peterson, R.N. Stavins, R.N Environmental regulation and the
competitiveness of United States manufacturing — What does the evidence tell
us?, J. Econ. Lit. 33 (1995) 132–163.
B. Javorcik, S. Wei, Pollution havens and foreign direct investment: dirty secret or
popular myth?, Contrib. Econ. Anal. Pol. 3 (2004) Article 8.
W. Keller, A. Levinson, Pollution abatement costs and direct foreign investment
inflows in the United States, Rev. Econ. Stat. 84 (2002) 691–703.
P. Krugman, Increasing returns and economic geography, J. Polit. Econ. 99 (1991)
183–199.
P. Krugman, A.J. Venables, Globalization and the inequality of nations, Q. J. Econ.
110 (1995) 857–880.
E. Leamer, Sources of International Comparative Advantage: Theory and Evidence,
MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1984.
A. Levinson, M.S. Taylor, Unmasking the pollution haven effect, Int. Econ. Rev. 49
(2008) 223-254.
J.A. List, C.Y. Co, The effects of environmental regulations on foreign direct
investment, J. Environ. Econ. Manage. 40 (2000) 1–20.
13

http://services.bepress.com/feem/paper261

12

Mulatu et al.: Environmental Regulation and Industry Location

[22] J.A. List, W.W. McHone, Measuring the effects of air quality regulations on “dirty”
firm births: evidence from the neo- and mature-regulatory periods, Pap. Reg. Sci. 79
(2000) 177– 90.
[23] J.A. List, W.W. McHone, D.L. Millimet, P.G. Fredriksson, Effects of
environmental regulations on manufacturing plant births: evidence from a
propensity score matching estimator, Rev. Econ. Stat. 85 (2003) 944–952.
[24] P. Low, A. Yeats, Do ‘dirty’ industries migrate?, in P. Low (Ed.), International
Trade and the Environment, World Bank, Washington DC, 1992, pp. 89–103.
[25] K.H. Midelfart-Knarvik, H.G. Overman, A.J. Venables, Comparative Advantage
and Economic Geography: Estimating the Location of Production in the EU. Centre
for Economic Policy Research Discussion Paper No. 2618, 2000a.
[26] K.H. Midelfart-Knarvik, H.G. Overman, S.J. Redding, A.J. Venables, The Location
of European Industry, Economic Papers No. 142. European Commission, D-G for
Economic and Financial Affairs, Brussels, 2000b.
[27] D.L. Millimet, J. A. List, The case of the missing pollution haven hypothesis, J.
Regul. Econ. 26 (2004) 239–262.
[28] A. Mulatu, R. Florax, C. Withagen, Environmental regulation and international
trade: empirical results for Germany, the Netherlands and the US, 1977–1992,
Contrib. Econ. Anal. Pol. 3 (2004) Article 5.
[29] L. Pellegrini, R. Gerlagh, Corruption and environmental policies: what are the
implications for the enlarged EU?, Euro. Environ. 16 (2006a) 139–154.
[30] L. Pellegrini, R. Gerlagh, Corruption, democracy and environmental policy: an
empirical contribution to the debate, J. Environ. Devel. 15 (2006b) 332–354.
[31] C. Pratten (1988) A Survey of the Economies of Scale, in Commission of the
European Communities: Research on the Costs of non-Europe, 2: Studies on the
Economics of Integration, 1988.
[32] K. Preacher, P. Curran, D. Bauer, Simple Intercepts, Simple Slopes, and Regions of
Significance in MLR 2-Way Interactions. Available from http://www.psych.ku.edu/
preacher/interact/mlr2.htm, 2003.
[33] J. Reinaud, Industrial competitiveness under the European Union Emissions
Trading Scheme. International Energy Agency Information Paper, 2004.
[34] S. Taylor, Unbundling the pollution haven hypothesis, Adv. Econ. Anal. Pol. 4
(2004) Article 8.
[35] A.J. Venables, Equilibrium locations of vertically linked industries, Int. Econ. Rev.
37 (1996) 341–359.
[36] R. Wolfe, Crossing the river by feeling the stones: where the WTO is going after
Seattle, Doha and Cancun, Rev. Int. Polit. Econ. 11 (2004) 574–596.
[37] J. Wooldridge, Introductory Econometrics: A Modern Approach, 3rd Ed, Thomson
South-Western, 2006.
[38] Y.O. Xing, C.D. Kolstad, Do lax environmental regulations attract foreign
investment?, Environ. Resource Econ. 21 (2002) 1–22.

14

Published by Berkeley Electronic Press Services, 2009

13

Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Working Papers, Art. 261 [2009]

Table 1. Country characteristics
Variable (Interaction
Definition
channel)

Source

Mean Stand. Min
Dev.

Max

Population

Share of EU population living in country i
(average over 1990-1994)

OECD

Agricultural abundance
(1)

Value of agricultural output as a share of GDP
(1994)

Midelfart-Knarvik et al. [26] 0.047 0.027 0.019 0.125

0.076 0.070 0.014 0.219

Skilled labor abundance Share of population aged 25-59 with at least
(2)
secondary education (1997)

Midelfart-Knarvik et al. [26] 0.602 0.178 0.238 0.821

Research & Development Researchers per 100 labor force (1996)
abundance (3)

Midelfart-Knarvik et al. [26] 0.477 0.163 0.200 0.780

Environmental standard One minus the Environmental Sustainability
laxity (4)
Index/100 (2001)

World Economic Forum,
Yale Center for
Environmental Law and
Policy, and CIESIN

Market potential (5,6,7) Indictors of market potential based on own and
trading partners’ GDP in ’00000 £ (around the
year 1990)

Midelfart-Knarvik et al. [26] 0.086 0.041 0.023 0.133

0.365 0.093 0.195 0.559

Notes: The 13 countries with the values of their respective characteristics are reported in the appendix in Table A.1.
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Table 2. Industry characteristics
Variable (Interaction
channel)

Definition

Source

Log Industry shares

Average share of industry k in country i over 1991-1994

OECD STAN industrial
database 1998

Agricultural input
intensity (1)

Total use of agricultural input as a share of value of
OECD input-output table,
production (weighted average of Denmark, Germany, France 1990
and UK for 1990)

Mean

Stand.
Dev.

Min

Max

-3.30

1.32

-7.20

-0.94

0.019

0.057

0.000

0.234

Skilled labor intensity (2) Average pay in industry relative to the pay in manufacturing
as a whole which is one (1990)

OECD STAN Indicators
database 2005

1.085

0.194

0.706

1.407

R&D intensity (3)

Research & Development expenditure as a share of value
added (1990)

OECD ANBERD, 1973-1998

0.086

0.113

0.002

0.357

Pollution intensity 1 (4)

Pollution abatement and control costs as a share of the value
of industry output in the USA for 1988

Low and Yeats (1992)

0.733

0.581

0.235

2.170

Pollution intensity 2 (4)

Weight of releases of toxic substances (average over 19901995 normalized by the value of shipments for 1992)

US Environmental Protection
Agency

1.670

1.874

0.122

5.483

Intermediate input use
(5)

Total use of intermediates as a share of value of production OECD input-output table,
(weighted average of Denmark, Germany, France and UK for 1990
1990)

0.419

0.155

0.000

0.612

Sales to industry (6)

Sales to domestic industry (as intermediates and exports) as a OECD input-output table,
share of value of production (weighted average of Denmark, 1990
Germany, France and UK for 1990)

0.403

0.224

0.000

0.740

Plant size (7)

Indicator of economies of scale: number of employees per
plant (1988)

4.769

4.559

0.378

15.000

Pratten (1988)

Notes: The 16 industries (ISIC Rev.2 codes) with the values of their respective characteristics are reported in the appendix in Table A.2. The ‘Petroleum &
Coal products’ and ‘Other Manufacturing’ industries have been excluded because the former is virtually a natural resource industry and the latter is a
‘residual’ and cannot plausibly be described as a particular industry.
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Table 3. Regression results
Model:
I

II

III

IV

Dependent variable: ln(sik)
Size variable
Population

1.04 ***

1.04 ***

1.04 ***

1.04 ***

Interaction channels ( β j )
Agricultural abundance * intensity
Skilled labor abundance * intensity
R&D abundance * intensity
Environmental laxity * poll. Intensity
Market potential * Sales to industry
Market potential * Intermediate input use
Market potential * Plant size

31.44 *
1.83
4.04 **
1.21 **
-5.60
-4.52
0.17

32.10 *
1.81
4.18 **
0.40 **
-5.67
-4.18
0.16

35.16 **
1.97
4.66 **
1.20 **

35.22 **
1.96
4.78 **
0.41 **

–0.02
0.95
0.16
0.23
0.19
0.07
0.17

–0.01
0.93
0.15
0.24
0.19
0.09
0.20

0.01
0.88
0.45
0.21

0.004
0.80
0.49
0.26

0.45
1.05
0.03
2.08
0.41

0.42
1.04
0.04
0.86

0.41
1.04
0.04
2.04

Sales to industry♣

0.46
1.05
0.03
0.87
0.41

Intermediate input use♣
Plant size♣

0.41
4.09

0.41
4.09
208
0.84

208
0.84

Country characteristics cut-off points ( χ j )
Agricultural abundance
Skilled labor abundance
R&D abundance
Environmental standards laxity
Market potential

Industry attributes cut-off points ( γ j )
Agricultural input intensity
Skilled labor intensity
R&D intensity
Pollution intensity

N
208
208
2
Adj. R
0.84
0.84
Notes:
* is significant at 10% level. ** is significant at 5% level. *** is significant at 1%.
♣

The fifth, sixth and seventh interaction effects all use the same country characteristic Market Potential. As a result, in
equation (2), x5=x6=x7, consequently we cannot estimate γ ′ 5 separately from γ′ 6 and γ′ 7 to identify the cut off points.
Since the first two associated industry attributes (sales, intermediate input use) are of about the same size, while the
third attribute (plant size) is about ten times larger (Table 2), we impose γ 5 = γ 6 and γ 7 = 10 ·γ 5, and this condition
enables us to identify the cut off points.
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Table 4. Standardized coefficients of interaction effects at the jointly estimated cut
off points
Model:
III

IV

Agricultural abundance * intensity

0.298*

0.298*

Skilled labor abundance * intensity

0.096

0.077

R&D abundance * intensity

0.071**

0.072**

Environmental laxity * poll. Intensity

0.096**

0.103**

18
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Table 5. Marginal effects of country characteristics evaluated for the most intensive
industries
Model:
III

IV

III′

IV′

Agricultural abundance

-6.365

**

-6.351

**

-0.131

**

-0.131

**

Skilled labor abundance

1.912

*

1.909

*

0.097

*

0.097

*

R&D abundance

1.470

**

1.502

0.185
*** 0.182
**
***
Environmental stand. Laxity
1.565
0.099
** 1.408
** 0.110
**
**
Notes: * is significant at 10% level. ** is significant at 5% level. *** is significant at 1%.
Column (III′) and (IV′) present coefficients for normalized dependent and independent variables
with unit s.d.

19
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Table 6. Actual, predicted & counterfactual production shares
Agricultural input

Skilled labor input

R&D input

Environmental input

Food, beverages &
tobacco

Drugs & medicines

Radio, TV &
communication
equipment

Industrial chemicals

1. Most abundant country & its
production share

Greece:
1.7

Denmark:
1.7

Sweden:
2.7

Belgium:
4.8

2. Least abundant country & its
production share

Belgium:
5.6

Portugal:
1.3

Greece:
0.3

Finland:
1.0

3. Most abundant country

2.9

1.8

4.1

7.3

4. Least abundant country

4.8

1.3

0.5

0.8

Most intensive industry

Actual shares (%)

Predicted shares (%)

Counterfactual shares when countries would swap abundance values (%)
5. Most abundant country

5.2

1.2

1.7

3.1

6. Least abundant country

2.7

1.9

1.1

2.0

% point difference between predicted & counterfactual shares
(3) – (5)

–2.3

0.6

2.4

4.2

(6) – (4)

–2.1

0.6

0.6

1.2

Note: Estimates are based on the regression with pollution intensity variable 1.
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Figure 1. The marginal effect of environmental standard laxity on production shares
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Table A.1. List of countries with the values of their characteristics
Country Population Agricultural Secondary &
Research &
(average, production higher education Scientists %
1990-1994) as % GDP
% population
labor force
Austria
2.1
3.2
75.1
34
Belgium
2.7
1.9
60.6
53
Denmark
1.4
4.5
82.1
58
Finland
1.4
6.6
72.6
67
France
15.9
3.5
62.7
60
Germany
21.9
3
82.1
59
Greece
2.8
12.5
49.3
20
Italy
15.5
4.1
41.4
32
Netherlands
4.1
4
65.9
46
Portugal
2.7
7.3
23.8
31
Spain
10.6
5.4
35.1
32
Sweden
2.4
3.4
76.7
78
UK
15.7
2
55.3
50
Notes: definitions of variables and data sources are presented in Table 1.
1

Market Environmental
potential
regulation
stringency1
12303
67.9
13264
44.1
6627.8
67
3642.1
80.5
12380
65.8
13073
64.2
2335.7
53.1
8715.1
54.3
12840
3193.8
4993.2
5810.5
12226

66
61.4
59.5
77.1
64.1

Environmental standard laxity is therefore the inverse of these figures.
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Table A.2. List of industries with the values of their characteristics
ISIC Rev.2 codes
Agricultural Skill
R&D Pollution Pollution Intermedi Industry Plant size
intensity intensity intensity intensity 1 intensity 2 ate input
sales
intensity
Food, beverages & tobacco
0.2579
90.2 0.0131 0.3275
0.1217 0.6152
0.26
2.23
Textiles, apparel & leather
0.0055
70.6 0.0055 0.3109
0.6337 0.4169
0.2652
0.38
Wood products & furniture
0.0426
75.5 0.0022 0.5273
0.9499 0.4833
0.4002
1.8
Paper, paper products & printing
0.0035
109.6 0.007
0.6031
1.1395 0.4534
0.6878
1.4
Industrial chemicals
0.0005
134.9 0.0658
2.17
5.4826 0.4521
0.4065
5.71
Drugs & medicines
0.0001
140.7 0.2871
1.71
5.4826 0.4131
0.207
5.71
Rubber & plastic products
0.0029
104.8 0.0221
0.442
1.4784 0.3688
0.5971
3.5
Non-metallic mineral products
0.0002
103
0.012
0.8556
0.6576 0.4653
0.7484
0.98
Iron & steel
0.0001
121.7 0.0266
1.61
4.1136 0.5411
0.673
6.26
Non-ferrous metals
0
107.6 0.0265 1.0975
4.1136 0.3945
0.5166
15
Metal products
0.0001
91.4 0.0101 0.4883
0.8901 0.4328
0.5504
0.65
Non-electrical machinery
0.0001
133.8 0.289
0.3827
0.1695 0.4579
0.2144
10
Electrical apparatus, nec.
0.0001
114.1 0.0793
0.332
0.3765 0.429
0.3785
4.67
Radio, TV & communication
equipment
0.0001
114.4 0.3566
0.235
0.3765 0.3979
0.2158
14.5
Transport equipment
0.0001
119.5 0.0966 0.3671
0.4287 0.4814
0.1786
3
Professional goods
0.0002
103.6 0.0818 0.2657
0.309 0.3802
0.1704
0.5
Mean
0.02
108.463 0.086
0.733
1.67
0.449
0.404
4.768
Median
0
108.6 0.027
0.465
0.774
0.442
0.389
3.25
Notes: definitions of variables and data sources are presented in Table 1. The industry classification involves slight
modifications from the standard ISIC Rev.2 codes, namely that sub-industries of transport equipment and of nonelectrical machinery are aggregated because of missing data for some countries.
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